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ABSTRACT: Consider a specific type of fission where psychological continuity takes  
a branching form, and one of the offshoots comes into being later than the other off-
shoot. Let us say that the earlier offshoot comes into being in the left branch at t, and 
the later offshoot comes into being in the right branch at t+1. With regard to the ques-
tion how many persons are involved in this case, three answers are worth considering: 
(i) The original subject persists up to t; a distinct person comes into being immediately 
after t and continues to exist in the left branch; and the third person comes into being 
in the right branch at t+1. (ii) The original subject persists up to the moment imme-
diately before t+1; a distinct person comes into being at t+1 and continues to exist in 
the left branch; and the third person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. (iii) 
The original subject continues to exist in the left branch; a distinct person comes into 
being in the right branch at t+1. For those who hold that personal identity consists in 
psychological continuity of some sort, the aforementioned three options exhaust the 
sensible ways of understanding how one persists in delayed fission. However, I argue 
that complications arise for each answer. Hence, delayed fission poses a challenge for the 
psychological approach to personal identity. 
KEYWORDS: Delayed fission – fission – persistence condition – personal identity – psy-
chological approach to personal identity. 
 In this article, I will argue that there is an intractable problem for the 
mainstream position in the psychological approach to personal identity, 
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which I shall dub the standard psychological view of personal identity (or the 
standard psychological view, for short). This problem involves a specific 
type of fission where one of the offshoots comes into being later than the 
other offshoot. Call this type of fission delayed fission. My contention is that 
no version of the standard psychological view can plausibly explain the per-
sistence condition of delayed fission victims. 
1. The standard psychological view and delayed fission 
 Before introducing the problem, I need to be clear about the intended 
target of this article. The standard psychological view has probably re-
ceived the most thorough examinations by Derek Parfit (1971 and 1984) 
and Sydney Shoemaker (1970 and 1984), and has also been discussed by  
a great number of philosophers afterward.1 Like other versions of the 
psychological approach to personal identity, the standard psychological 
view holds that a person existing at one time and a person existing at 
another time are identical to each other by virtue of maintaining psycho-
logical continuity of some sort, where psychological continuity consists in 
overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness. A person exist-
ing at one time is strongly psychologically connected to a person existing at 
a different time just in case there exist a sufficient number of relevant psy-
chological connections holding between them,2
                                                     
1  For more recent discussions of the standard psychological view, see Brueckner 
(1993; 2005), Campbell (2001; 2005), and Noonan (2006). 
2  Here I follow Parfit’s explication of the notions of strong psychological connected-
ness and psychological connections (see Parfit 1984, 205-206). Parfit suggests a rather 
casual view regarding what counts as a sufficient number of psychological connections 
for maintaining psychological continuity. He proposes that there are a sufficient number 
of psychological connections holding from one day to the next if their number is “at 
least half the number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person” 
(Parfit 1984, 206). Since it is not necessary to specify the correct criterion of what 
counts as a sufficient number of psychological connections for the purpose of this ar-
ticle, I will simply assume that there is a plausible criterion for determining such  
a number. 
 such as memories, the con-
tinuation of beliefs, desires, intentions, and other suitable psychological 
states/capacities and characteristics, underpinned by the right kind of 
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cause.3
 Bearing in mind the aforementioned key tenets of the standard psycho-
logical view, I will now turn to the problem posed by delayed fission. Im-
agine a case where one’s body is scanned and continues to exist, and after 
some time, a new human body is generated at a different place exactly in ac-
cordance with the scanned information. Assuming that the scanning and 
duplication process is successful, the person occupying the new body is psy-
chologically exactly similar to the original person as he is at the time of the 
scanning. Call this case Delayed Replication, as diagramed below:
 The standard psychological view also holds that in a case of regular 
fission where two offshoots diverge at the same time, the pre-fission sub-
ject is numerically distinct from either of the two post-fission offshoots, and 
thus that three persons are involved in total. In this respect, this view is dif-
ferent from the one developed by David Lewis (1976) and other perdurant-
ists, which claims that a regular fission case involves two distinct continuants 
partially overlapping each other before the fission. The standard psychologi-
cal view does not allow overlaps at any time before or during the fission. In 
short, the standard psychological view holds that (i) personal identity consists 
in non-branching psychological continuity, and thus that (ii) in a regular fis-










Mathematically speaking, a total of eight possibilities can be suggested with 
regard to the identities among A, B, and C: 
 
                                                     
3  Regarding the causal basis of psychological connections, Parfit thinks that the right 
kind of cause is any cause, as opposed to the normal cause (which requires the contin-
ued existence of the same brain) or any reliable cause (cf. Parfit 1984, 208-209). I will 
follow Parfit’s view on the right kind of cause in this article, although most of my ar-
guments will work with other views as well. 
4  As the diagram suggests, A is the continuant person persisting up to t; B is the 
continuant person persisting between t and t+1 (exclusive—i.e., not including t or t+1); 
C and D are the continuant persons persisting at and after t+1 in the left branch and in 
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 (1)  A≠B, B≠C, and A≠C 
 (2)  A≠B, B≠C, and A=C 
 (3)  A≠B, B=C, and A≠C [the First Route] 
 (4)  A≠B, B=C, and A=C 
 (5)  A=B, B≠C, and A≠C [the Second Route] 
 (6)  A=B, B≠C, and A=C 
 (7)  A=B, B=C, and A≠C 
 (8)  A=B, B=C, and A=C [the Third Route] 
It is clear that (4), (6), and (7) cannot be the case because they all lead to 
contradiction. As for (1) and (2), neither is inconsistent; however, I do not 
think that (1) and (2) are worth much consideration because they are less 
plausible than (3), and as I shall argue later, (3) is problematic.5
 The First Route holds that A is not identical to B, although B is iden-
tical to C. So, on this alternative, A ceases to exist immediately after t, and 
a new person comes into being from that time on (in the left branch). If 
this is true, then we will have to conclude that a mere scanning process can 
 This leaves 
us (3), (5), and (8) as the least untenable of all the options. I shall call 
them, respectively, the First Route, the Second Route, and the Third 
Route. Confronted with delayed fission, advocates of the standard psycho-
logical view must choose one of the three routes, since the aforementioned 
three routes exhaust all the sensible options. In what follows, however,  
I will argue that given that our persistence condition is psychological in na-
ture, each of them yields deeply implausible implications. 
2. Problems with the First Route 
                                                     
5  More specifically, I claim that (1) and (2) are less plausible than (3) because they 
have all the disadvantages of (3) that I will specify in the following section on the First 
Route, while they have no particular advantages over (3). (1) and (2) also share some 
disadvantages of (5) that are discussed in the section on the Second Route, which are 
not shared by (3). See footnotes 9 and 10. In arguing this way, I assume that we are 
continuant beings that persist for some time. Those who believe that we are ephemeral 
time-slice of continuant persons (see, e.g., Sider 1996; 2001, 188-208) or that the en-
during self is an illusion (see, e.g., Hume 2000, Book 1, Part 4, Sec. 6) may challenge 
this assumption. However, I will not discuss these views here because that would take 
us beyond the scope of this article. 
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terminate one’s existence without disturbing his memories, beliefs, inten-
tions, and any other psychological features. That is very hard to believe. 
 A possible defense of the First Route may resort to the distinction that 
Parfit draws between personal identity and what matters in survival. Parfit 
famously argued that what matters in survival is the preservation of psycho-
logical continuity, not personal identity per se (cf. Parfit 1984, 253-261). 
According to him, for example, what I ought to be concerned about in fac-
ing life-threatening incidents such as an imminent battle is not whether  
I will still exist after the incident but whether there will be someone psy-
chologically continuous with me as I am now before the incident. Employ-
ing this idea, proponents of the First Route may argue that as long as what 
matters to A is preserved in B, it is immaterial whether A is identical to B 
or not, and therefore it is not so implausible to claim that A is not identical 
to B in Delayed Replication. 
 This response does not strike me as tenable. Even if we grant that there 
is a conceptual difference between personal identity and what matters in sur-
vival, and that the former, unlike the latter, carries no prudential value, this 
does not imply that personal identity may hold in an unprincipled way. For 
instance, if a theory claims for no good reason that I will suddenly cease to 
exist as soon as I step out of this room, though, of course, what matters to 
me before I go out is preserved in the person who will be just outside the 
room, this theory ought to be deemed implausible. Parfit has a principled an-
swer as to the holding of personal identity: he thinks that personal identity is 
constituted by psychological continuity that does not take a “branching” 
form.6
 Proponents of the First Route may try to explain away the implausibili-
ty just noted by considering a different type of delayed fission—one involv-
ing a brain transplant, as opposed to a bodily scanning process. Imagine  
a case where one’s psychological capacities and contents are not lateralized 
 In Delayed Replication, the psychological continuity holding between 
A and B does not take a branching form. So, on Parfit’s view, it ought to be 
the case that A=B, contra the First Route. Those who argue for the First 
Route still need to provide a principled answer to the question why one ceas-
es to exist while going through the scanning process in Delayed Replication. 
                                                     
6  Some have argued that it is impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to formally 
define the non-branching clause in a non-circular manner (see, e.g., Brueckner 2005; 
Brueckner – Buford 2008). In my (2010) article, I proffer three formulations of the 
non-branching clause that do not involve a circular reasoning. 
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in the brain; his two brain hemispheres have more or less the same capaci-
ties, and they are mutually completely redundant in their psychological con-
tents because they share most of the contents through the corpus callosum; 
as a result, they are almost symmetrical with respect to their psychological 
states/capacities, psycho-physical characteristics, etc. Suppose also that the 
two hemispheres are removed from the original subject’s cranium, and the 
right hemisphere is preserved in a special device where it remains biologically 
functional but unconscious; it will gain consciousness once transplanted to  
a living human body. The left hemisphere, while in an unconscious state, is 
transplanted to a brainless, living human body, and a few days later the right 











the two brain hemispheres are quite similar to each other, each of the two 
resulting persons, as soon as he gains consciousness, is strongly psychologi-
cally connected to the original person before the transplant operation to al-
most the same degree. Call this case Delayed Division, as diagramed below: 
                                                     
7  Some may doubt whether this case is really an example of delayed fission on the 
grounds that the unconscious right hemisphere may be like a brain in hibernation. On 
this view, there exists a person kept in existence by the right hemisphere while it is in 
the device, and that person is like an ordinary person in a state of dreamless sleep. 
Those who think this way may adapt the story as they see fit so that the adapted story 
is clearly a case of delayed fission. For example, one might stipulate that the right he-
misphere, after removal, is to be divided into many pieces, carefully preserved in separate 
places without irreparable damage, and later reassembled exactly as they were before the 
surgery. I leave it open what the best adaptation of the story will look like. The point 
that I make in what follows does not hinge on the particular details of the story, but ra-
ther on its structural features. For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that my previous de-
scription involving the removal and preservation of one hemisphere provides a case of 
delayed fission. 
A' 
t+2 (D' gains consciousness) 
t (The brain is removed) 
t+1 (B' gains consciousness) 
(One hemisphere is  
in the special device) 
D' C' 
B' 
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(The dashed line on the left-hand side between t and t+1 indicates the 
time during which the transplantation of the left hemisphere is performed. 
The dashed line on the right-hand side between t and t+2 indicates the 
time during which the right hemisphere is preserved in the special device.) 
 Since Delayed Division is structurally quite similar to Delayed Replica-
tion, proponents of the First Route, to be consistent, must hold that 
A'≠B'. This implies that A' ceases to exist as soon as his brain is removed 
at t. Since the end of A' ’s existence involves a rather dramatic turn of 
events – i.e., the removal of the brain resulting in complete loss of con-
sciousness – a proponent of the First Route might argue that this implica-
tion is at least not as absurd as what the First Route implies about Delayed 
Replication: namely, that one ceases to exist as soon as his body goes 
through the scanning process. 
 However, I do not see much advantage in this maneuver because it 
seems to me that to hold that A'≠B' in Delayed Division is no more plaus-
ible than to hold that A≠B in Delayed Replication. To see this point, im-
agine that one undergoes a surgery where the surgeons remove one’s right 
hemisphere and preserve it in a special device as described in Delayed Divi-
sion. (Again, as in Delayed Division, suppose that the two hemispheres are 
psychologically quite similar to each other with respect to their psychologi-
cal states/capacities, psycho-physical characteristics, etc.) The removed 
hemisphere maintains the ability to regain consciousness; but let it be sti-
pulated that, as a matter of fact, the surgeons will never transplant the right 
hemisphere to a brainless living body.8
                                                     
8  Here again, I assume that there is no person kept in (or brought into) existence by 
the right hemisphere while it is in the device. Those who think otherwise should revise 
the case as they see fit so that the brain material constituting the right hemisphere in 
the revised case, while restorable to a biologically functional state, fails to give rise to 
the existence of a person. 
 Meanwhile, the subject’s left hemis-
phere remains intact and fully functional in the original body, maintaining 
psychological continuity with the subject before the removal of the right 
hemisphere. Call this case Half-brain Removal (see the Appendix for the 
diagram). I think it would be surprising if anyone denies that the subject 
survives the surgery in Half-brain Removal. After all, in many actual cases 
where a considerable amount of a patient’s cerebrum is removed, people do 
not seem to doubt that the patient survives the surgery. 
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 Now, imagine a story exactly like Half-brain Removal except that one’s 
entire cerebrum is removed, and only the left hemisphere is transplanted to 
a brainless, living human body. The right hemisphere is to be kept perma-
nently in the device. Call this case Half-brain Transfer (see the Appendix 
for the diagram). The only difference between Half-brain Removal and 
Half-brain Transfer is that the left hemisphere remains in the original 
body in the former case, but not in the latter case. According to the psy-
chological criterion of personal identity, however, there should be no sig-
nificant difference between the two cases. This is because, in either case, 
perfect psychological continuity is preserved between the original subject 
and the possessor of the left hemisphere after the surgery. Therefore, advo-
cates of the standard psychological view should hold that if the subject in 
Half-brain Removal survives the surgery, then the subject in Half-brain 
Transfer survives as well. 
 But what happens in Half-brain Transfer is structurally exactly similar 
to what happens in Delayed Division up to the moment just short of t+2. 
Hence, if the subject in Half-brain Transfer survives the surgery, then we 
should conclude that the original subject in Delayed Division – i.e., A' – 
continues to exist up to the moment just short of t+2. This entails that 
A'=B', contra the First Route. 
 We can recapitulate the preceding argument as follows: 
 PR1: The subject in Half-brain Removal survives the surgery. 
 PR2: If the subject in Half-brain Removal survives the surgery, then 
the subject in Half-brain Transfer survives the surgery. 
 PR3: If the subject in Half-brain Transfer survives the surgery, then 
A'=B' in Delayed Division. 
 C:  A'=B' in Delayed Division. 
 Setting aside differences in minor details among the three cases (Half-
brain Removal, Half-brain Transfer, and Delayed Division until just before 
t+2) as insignificant, advocates of the First Route must grant PR2 and 
PR3. The only way to resist the argument then is to deny PR1. But that 
would be tantamount to saying that the removal of half of one’s brain mat-
ter terminates one’s existence. From the perspective of the standard psy-
chological view, this ought to sound as implausible as saying that a mere 
scanning process can terminate one’s existence (given that the recipient of 
the left hemisphere in the Delayed Replication is strongly psychologically 
connected to the original person before the surgery.) One problem with the 
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First Route then is that it implies that a mere scanning of one’s body or 
the removal and preservation of half of one’s brain terminates one’s exis-
tence. 
 Apart from the preceding observation, the First Route faces an even 
more serious problem: given the truth of the First Route, whether one sur-
vives the scanning of one’s body or the transfer of one’s half-brain depends 
on what will happen to someone else in the future. To illustrate this prob-
lem, consider a case exactly like Half-brain Transfer except that it has not 
yet been determined whether the surgeons will perform the operation of 
transplanting the right hemisphere—either they will permanently leave it 
in the device or they will transplant it into a living, brainless human body 
after a while. Call this case Indeterminate Division (see the appendix for the 
diagram). Suppose that I am the recipient of the left hemisphere shortly af-
ter the surgery. Having just gained consciousness, I seem to remember the 
experiences and memories of the original person before the surgery. Natu-
rally, this leads me to believe that I have existed for a long time before the 
surgery. Would I be right? According to the First Route, whether I am 
right in holding this belief depends on what will happen to the right he-
misphere in the future. If it is somehow destroyed before the surgeons per-
form the further surgery or if the surgeons end up not performing a further 
operation, then the situation would be structurally similar to Half-brain 
Transfer. Hence, advocates of the First Route should conclude that the 
person who underwent the initial surgery has survived it, which entails that 
I have existed before the surgery. On the other hand, if the surgeons decide 
to perform the surgery, and end up successfully performing the operation 
of transplanting the right hemisphere to a different recipient body, thereby 
bringing a person into existence, then the situation would be structurally 
similar to Delayed Division. In that case, since the First Route holds that 
A'≠B' in Delayed Division, proponents of the First Route should also con-
clude that it turns out that I have not existed before the initial surgery. 
Hence, according to the First Route, whether in Indeterminate Division  
I have or have not existed in the past before the initial surgery depends on 
whether there will be a recipient of the right hemisphere in the future. 
Many would find this result implausible. Suppose I, having gained con-
sciousness after the surgery, ask myself whether I am the same person as 
the one who was anxious about the surgery. If the aforementioned result is 
correct, then I should answer, “I don’t know yet. To answer this question,  
I will have to wait and see whether the right hemisphere of the original 
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subject will be successfully transplanted to a different human body.” The 
absurdity of this remark seems to me to be a sufficient reason to reject the 
First Route.9
 The Second Route specifies that A=B and B≠C in Delayed Replica-
tion. This implies that A (=B) continues to exist until immediately before 
t+1, but ceases to exist as soon as his “replica” (=D) comes into being in 
the right branch at t+1. To illustrate the implausibility of this implication, 
imagine that you are B in Delayed Replication shortly before t+1. Your 
body was scanned a while ago (at t), and based on the information from the 
scanning process, someone other than you is now about to come into exis-
tence someplace else. Suppose you are not aware of these facts (perhaps you 
were not even informed why your body was scanned). Now, imagine that, 
at the very moment your “replica” comes into being, you were in the mid-
dle of uttering a sentence in a discussion with your friend. If B≠C as speci-
fied in the Second Route, we will have to conclude that you have never 
completed the sentence you were uttering, because you would have ceased 
to exist before the sentence was fully uttered. The person who completed 
the sentence would not be you. This is strikingly implausible. Your friend 
would not believe that her conversation partner has just been replaced with 
a different person who is bodily continuous with you (and thus looks just 
like you), and is psychologically continuous with you (and thus talks and 
thinks just like you), but who is not aware that (s)he has just come into ex-
istence. That being who completed the sentence certainly would not be-
lieve that (s)he has just come into existence with all those quasi-memories, 
quasi-beliefs, and quasi-intentions that seem to have been his/her own for 
a long time. In sum, it is hard to accept that the coming-to-be of someone 
else terminates your existence. This problem has to do with the violation of 
what is known as the only x and y principle in the literature on personal 
identity. This principle states that whether or not x is identical to y must 
 
3. Problems with the Second Route 
                                                     
9  Note that the problems with the First Route that I specify in this section stem from 
the fact that it holds that A≠B in Delayed Replication. Since (1) and (2) in the previous 
section also hold that A≠B, they are susceptible to these problems as well. This obser-
vation partially justifies my previous claim that (1) and (2) are less plausible than the 
First Route; cf. footnote 10. 
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depend only on the intrinsic features of the relation between them; it can-
not depend on a fact about any individual other than x and y (see Noonan 
2003, 129; Wiggins 1980, 96). Against the initial plausibility of this prin-
ciple, if B≠C as specified in the Second Route, then your continued exis-
tence depends on whether or not “your replica” comes into being some-
where else.10
 I do not find this argument convincing. For argument’s sake, let us 
grant the defenders of the Second Route that A=B in Delayed Replication 
(and let us refer to either A or B indiscriminately as the pre-fission sub-
ject). Nevertheless, it is questionable that C and D are in competition to be 
the same as the pre-fission subject as specified in the preceding argument, 
for it is doubtable that the relations C and D bear to the pre-fission subject 
are analogous to those that the two offshoots bear to the original subject in 
regular fission. This is because D as he is at t+1, unlike C as he is at t+1, is 
not psychologically connected to B as he is immediately before t+1, given 
that psychological connections must be underpinned by some sort of causal 
basis. The psychological states of D as he is at t+1 may be qualitatively 
 
 Proponents of the Second Route may respond by arguing that the stan-
dard psychological view maintains that personal identity obtains only in the 
absence of a concurrent competitor that is also psychologically continuous 
with the original subject, and that C as he is at t+1 is psychologically conti-
nuous with A as he is at t. The standard psychological view has it that both 
of the two offshoots in regular fission are not identical with the original 
subject because they are in competition: due to both offshoots being psy-
chologically continuous with the original subject, they have an equal claim 
to be the same person as the original subject. Personal identity is preserved 
only when there is no concurrent competitor. In Delayed Replication, the 
argument goes, B has no concurrent competitor, and is psychologically 
continuous with A. Hence, the standard psychological view ought to claim 
that A=B. On the other hand, C and D are in competition. Therefore, the 
standard psychological view should hold that A (=B) is not identical with 
either C or D. This is what is implied by the Second Route. 
                                                     
10  Note that the problem that I specify in this paragraph is due to the fact that the 
Second Route holds that B≠C in Delayed Replication. Since (1) and (2) also hold that 
B≠C, they are susceptible to this problem as well. On the other hand, the First Route 
is not vulnerable to this problem, since it holds that B=C in Delayed Replication. This 
is another partial basis for holding that the First Route is more sustainable than (1) or 
(2); cf. footnote 9. 
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quite similar to the psychological states of B as he is immediately before 
t+1. However, the psychological states of the former are not causally related 
to those of the latter. By contrast, the psychological states of C as he is at 
t+1 are immediately caused by the psychological states of B as he is imme-
diately before t+1, just like the way in which the psychological states of the 
two offshoots in regular fission as they are immediately after the fission are 
caused by the psychological states of the pre-fission subject as he is at the 
moment of fission. Consequently, C as he is at t+1 and D as he is at t+1 do 
not stand in the same relations to B as he is immediately before t+1. Unlike 
the two offshoots in regular fission, C and D in Delayed Replication do not 
have an equal claim to be the same person as the pre-fission subject. The 
preceding argument is mistaken in claiming that D is a legitimate competi-
tor of C in Delayed Replication. 
 There is a further problem for the Second Route. Since B and D are 
neither psychologically nor bodily continuous with each other,11
                                                     
11  B and D are not psychologically continuous with each other because the psychologi-
cal states of B as he is immediately before t+1 and the psychological states of D as he is 
at t+1 are not causally related to each other. In addition, if the temporal distance be-
tween t and t+1 is long enough, B as he is immediately before t+1 and D as he is at t+1 
will tend to be psychologically dissimilar. 
 we can 
plausibly assume that they are two distinct persons. Then, since the Second 
Route holds that A=B in Delayed Replication, it follows that A≠D. So, 
the Second Route yields the result that A as he is at t is identical to B as he 
is immediately after t, and that A as he is at t is not identical to D as he is 
at t+1. However, this result does not accord well with the standard psycho-
logical view. With respect to their psychology, B as he is immediately after 
t and D as he is at t+1 are exactly alike, and their psychological states are 
causally related to the psychological states of A as he is at t in exactly simi-
lar way. How is it then that only B as he is immediately after t, but not D 
as he is at t+1, is identical to A as he is at t? If the only relevant determi-
nant of personal identity is psychological in nature as the standard psycho-
logical view maintains, and B as he is immediately after t and D as he is at 
t+1 do not differ in their internal psychology as well as in the psychological 
relations they stand to A as he is at t, then proponents of the Second 
Route owe us an explanation as to why it is that A as he is at t is identical 
to B as he is immediately after t, but not to D as he is at t+1. 
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4. Problems with the Third Route 
 The results of the preceding discussion leave us with the Third Route. 
But there are problems for the Third Route as well. Suppose that in De-
layed Replication, A, B, and C are all identical with one another as speci-
fied in (8). Then, advocates of the Third Route should commit to one of 
the following alternatives regarding the identity of A and D: 
 (8a) A=B, B=C, A=C, and A=D; 
 (8b) A=B, B=C, A=C, and A≠D. 
 Here neither alternative is plausible. First, (8a) is not tenable, because it 
entails that C=D, which seems plainly false.12
                                                     
12  Parfit presents some striking examples regarding the implausibility of this result. 
For instance, (8a) implies that if C and D play tennis together, we ought to describe the 
situation by saying that one single person is playing tennis by himself, while mistakenly 
believing in each half of his divided mind that he is playing it with someone else. See 
Parfit (1984, 256-257). Ontological monists may grant that C=D on the grounds that 
everything that exists is one and the same. I will not discuss the monistic view here be-
cause that would be beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I will simply assume (as 
most, if not all, defenders of the standard psychological view seem to do) that there ex-
ist a number of distinct persons in the universe. 
 In addition, (8b) is implausi-
ble as well, since the story of Delayed Replication can be revised in such a 
way that it will be hard to explain how A=C and A≠D at the same time. 
Suppose that the interval between t and t+1 is very short—say, a mere few 
seconds. That is, suppose that D comes into being only a few seconds after 
the scanning of A’s body. Then, the internal psychology of C as he is at t+1 
would be almost the same as that of D as he is at t+1, because both of 
them would be psychologically connected to the psychological states of A 
as he is at t to almost the same degree. Then, why is it that A is identical 
to C but not to D? Perhaps one may answer that this is because C, but not 
D, has the right kind of causal basis connecting his psychology with A. 
This response seems to suggest that the right kind of causal basis involves 
the continuation of the same body, since C, but not D, is bodily conti-
nuous with A, and that seems to be the only notable difference between C 
and D as regards their relations with A. Then, this answer suggests that 
personal identity consists at least in part in bodily continuity. However, if 
an analysis implies that one person X is identical to some person Y but not 
to another person Z that is (almost) psychologically indistinguishable to Y 
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only on the grounds that Y, but not Z, is bodily continuous with X, I think 
the standard psychological view should reject the analysis. It just sounds 
like too much departure from a psychological approach of any stripe.13
 Note that, if the surgical procedure of transplanting two brain hemis-
pheres to distinct living human bodies becomes technologically available, 
and surgeons actually perform such a surgery, then most actual transplant 
cases will be instances of something like Seconds-delayed Division. This is 
because it is highly likely that the two resulting persons will not gain con-
sciousness at exactly the same time. Even if the surgeons are extremely 
 
 At this point, it may be worth noting that the Third Route is also sus-
ceptible to the second problem posed for the Second Route. Given that 
B≠D in Delayed Replication, proponents of the Third Route should hold 
that A=B and A≠D. Then, they should provide a plausible explanation 
why A is identical to B but not to D, despite the fact that B as he is imme-
diately after t and D as he is at t+1 are psychologically exactly alike and they 
are psychologically connected to A as he is at t in exactly similar way. 
 Finally, one can argue that the Third Route renders the identity condi-
tion of a person completely arbitrary. To see this point, imagine a case sim-
ilar to Delayed Division except that D' comes into being only a few seconds 
(as opposed to a few days) after B' does. Call this case Seconds-delayed Divi-
sion (see the Appendix for the diagram). The diagram of Seconds-delayed 
Division should be structurally identical to that of Delayed Division. So,  
I will reuse the diagram of Delayed Division in referring to the subjects of 
Seconds-delayed Division. (Only, in considering Seconds-delayed Division, 
the interval between t+1 and t+2 should be regarded as just a few seconds.) 
                                                     
13  Note that a different problem arises for the proponent of the Third Route in regard 
to delayed fission involving the transfer of one hemisphere of the brain to the debrained 
cranium of a live human body, the requisite delay occurring during the process of dis-
connecting and reconnecting the hemisphere-in-transfer (such as Delayed Division or 
Half-brain Transfer). In this type of delayed fission each of C' and D' is psychologically 
connected to A' by virtue of having one half of A' ’s brain, and retaining the same func-
tioning brain – or a sizeable portion thereof – is a natural candidate for being the right 
kind of causal basis, the rest of the body being irrelevant for the maintenance of psycho-
logical continuity. Such delayed fission cases would work against the proponent of the 
Third Route who holds that C', but not D', is identical with A'. For it would be arbi-
trary to favor C' ’s claim to being identical with A' and not D' ’s, given that both C' and 
D' have enough number of psychological connections to A' sustained by the same kinds 
of causal bases (i.e., retaining a sizable functioning portion of A' ’s brain). 
 D E L A Y E D  F I S S I O N  A N D  P E R S O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  187 
careful to transplant each hemisphere simultaneously, one of the hemis-
pheres will probably gain consciousness somewhat earlier than the other, 
depending on environmental variables such as the metabolic conditions of 
the recipient bodies. If the two hemispheres gain consciousness at an interval 
of a few seconds, then, assuming that each offshoot comes into being when 
they gain consciousness, the situation would be Seconds-delayed Division. 
 With this in mind, compare Seconds-delayed Division with an instance 
of regular fission, where the two hemispheres of the original subject are 
transplanted to two distinct human bodies and the two offshoots come into 
being at exactly the same time (call this case, plainly, Division—see the ap-
pendix for the diagram). The standard psychological view is supposed to 
hold that neither offshoot is identical to the pre-fission subject in Division. 
Now, the only difference between Division and Seconds-delayed Division is 
that in the latter one offshoot gains consciousness only a few seconds later 
than the other offshoot. This temporal disparity, however, is too slim to 
produce a significant difference between the two cases with respect to how 
the pre-fission subject is psychologically connected to the two resulting 
offshoots—in both cases, the original person is strongly psychologically 
connected to both offshoots to almost the same degree. Hence, the stan-
dard psychological view should hold, just as it does in regard to Division, 
that neither offshoot is identical to the original person in Seconds-delayed 
Division as well. However, as previously noted, advocates of the Third 
Route ought to maintain that A'=B' and A'≠D' in Seconds-delayed Divi-
sion. This means that, among the two resulting persons, whoever “wakes 
up” first after the surgery is entitled to be the original person. This sounds 
arbitrary. Imagine that you are one of the surgeons in Seconds-delayed Divi-
sion who have just performed the surgery. You have just successfully plugged 
each hemisphere of the original person into the craniums of two distinct 
human bodies, and are now waiting for the resulting persons to gain con-
sciousness. B' gains consciousness a few seconds earlier than D' does. Now, it 
would be arbitrary if you claim that B' is the one you have just performed the 
surgery on while you have never performed a surgery on D'. This sounds ar-
bitrary because B' and D', both being strongly psychologically connected to 
A' to almost the same degree, seem to have equal claim to be A'. And this is 
the very intuition that leads the standard psychological view to maintain that 
neither resulting offshoot is the original subject in Division. 
 In describing the aforementioned problem, I have assumed that each 
offshoot comes into existence as soon as the transplanted brain hemisphere 
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gains consciousness after the surgery. Of course, many can object to this as-
sumption, and they may be right to do so. Nevertheless, I think that  
a similar problem will arise for the Third Route when we take a different 
view as to how and when exactly the offshoots come into existence. For in-
stance, suppose we take the view that each offshoot comes into being as 
soon as each hemisphere is transplanted to the recipient body. The prob-
lem then is that, in the case where one hemisphere is transplanted to  
a body a few seconds earlier than the other hemisphere is transplanted to  
a different body, it would be arbitrary to hold that the former, and not the 
latter, is identical to the pre-fission subject. Here again, each offshoot 
seems to have an equal claim to be the original person insofar as their psy-
chology is concerned. To get around this problem, proponents of the 
Third Route must be able to explain why the interval between the respec-
tive emergences of the two offshoots, no matter how short it is, makes  
a significant difference to the effect that the earlier but not the later off-
shoot is identical to the pre-fission subject. They need to explain this 
without violating the spirit of the standard psychological view. 
 I have argued that each of the three routes is vulnerable to serious prob-
lems. Since anyone who endorses the standard psychological view must take 
one of them, I submit that the possibility of delayed fission poses a chal-
lenge for the standard psychological view of personal identity.14
                                                     
14  I am grateful to Dean Zimmerman and Boram Lee for helpful discussions on earlier 
drafts of this article. 
 
Appendix: Variant cases of fission and their diagrams 
(a) Delayed Replication: Scanning the body of the original subject, and af-
ter some delay in time, creating an exact replica based on the scanned 
information; 
(b) Delayed Division: Removing the two hemispheres of a brain and trans-
planting them to different human bodies at an interval of a few days, to 
the effect that one of the two resulting persons will gain consciousness  
a few days later than the other; 
(c) Half-brain Removal: Removing only one brain hemisphere from the 
original body and keeping it in a special device permanently; 
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(d) Half-brain Transfer: Removing the two hemispheres of a brain and 
transplanting one of them to a different human body while keeping the 
other permanently in a special device; 
(e) Indeterminate Division: Same as (d) except that it is not determined 
whether the hemisphere in the device will be transplanted to a different 
human body or left in the device permanently; 
(f) Seconds-delayed Division: Same as (b) except that the interval between 
the two resulting persons’ gaining of consciousness is only a few 
seconds; 
(g) Division: Removing the two hemispheres of a brain and transplanting 
them to different human bodies to the effect that the two resulting per-
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Diagram of Division 
t+1 (Both offshoots gain consciousness) 
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